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SOME CHECKS AND BALANCES IN GOVERN-
MENT.
"T S there," said John Adams, "a constitution upon record more
A complicated with balances than ours? In the first place eighteen
states and some territories are balanced against the national govern-
ment. ... In the second place, the house of representatives is
balanced against the senate, and the senate against the house. In
the third place, the executive authority is, in some degree, balanced
against the legislature. In the fourth place, the judiciary power is
balanced against the house, the senate, the executive power, and the
state governments. In the fifth place, the senate is balanced against
the president in all appointments to office, and in all treaties. . . .
In the sixth place, the people hold in their own hands the balance
against their own representatives, by biennial, which I wish had been
annual, elections. In the seventh place, the legislatures of the sev-
eral states are balanced against the senate by sextennial elections.
In the eighth place, the electors are balanced against the people in the
choice of the president. And here is a complication and refinement
of balances which, for anything I recollect, is an invention of our own
and peculiar to us."
This is a formidable enumeration of constitutional balances, but
the venerable ex-president had discovered that there may be some
which are extra constitutional. He was then in his seventy-ninth year,
and there had been opportunity to learn something of government,
or at least of those who manage governments, since he wrote so vol-
uminously of the American constitutions, boasting of their checks
and balances, so like those of Great Britain, and defying any one to
point in history to "a single example where the laws were respected,
and liberty, property, life, or character secure, without a balance in
the constitution." He had found that there may be constitutions
and balances of which the written law takes no notice, but which
may possibly control the written law. "All these wheels within








































































































































SOME CHECKS AND BALANCES
satisfy the people. They have invented a balance to all balances, in
their caucuses. We have congressional caucuses, state caucuses,
county caucuses, city caucuses, district caucuses, town caucuses,
parish caucuses, and Sunday caucuses at church doors; and in these
aristocratical caucuses, elections are decided!" 1
So formidable an array of balances ought, it would seem, to deter
any one from an attempted usurpation of power, were it not the
experience of the world that in governments the most secure protec-
tions too often prove futile. What, at this time, is the condition of
all those checks and balances, which, in 1787, the writers of the
Federalist, and those in sympathy with them, relied upon as consti-
tuting the sure defense, not less than the necessary condition, of
liberty? What has become of them in Great Britain, where the
monarch no longer ventures to withhold his assent to a law; and
where the house of peers no longer dares to refuse assent to a bill
which any strong public sentiment, -represented in the other house,
imperiously demands? Can it be said that either monarch, or house
of peers, is any longer a considerable check—much less a balance—
to a house of commons, whose sentiments control not legislation
merely, but executive action also? And who will venture to assert
that in this country the balances Mr. Adams enumerates have not
been very seriously disturbed in recent times, or that—to speak of
nothing further—the American senate has not been, gradually but
surely, appropriating to itself some measure of the authority, not
only of the lower house, but of the president, until, to a considerable
extent, it has become the dominant power in the government, only
in a less degree than has the popular branch of the legislature in
England? If this is true, it is certainly a striking and very impor-
tant fact, that while power in the monarchical country has been pass-
ing steadily, and by no means slowly, into the hands of the body
most directly representing the people, and most sensitive to public
opinion, in the republic, it has tended in the direction of the body
farthest removed from the people, and which, by its constitution, the
mode of election and term of office of its members, was intended to
be less directly answerable to public sentiment than even the presi-
dent himself.
There is little question as to where, at the present time, one must
look, in Great Britain, for the effectual balance. It is certainly not
to be found in any nice adjustment of authority, as between queen,
lords, and commons, for no such adjustment exists. The balance of







































































































































IN GOVERNMENT. '- 319
parties is much more effectual, and is usually sufficiently close to
render it necessary that the party in power shall be exceedingly cir-
cumspect in its action ; and, above all, that it shall not venture rashly
upon any measure of great importance. Where the effectual bal-
ances are to be found in this country is not very clear. The inquirer
would be certain to find fhat Mr. Adams' caucuses are very active
and very powerful, but whether he could trace their invention to the
people, or demonstrate that, in any proper sense, they are caucuses
of the people, is by no means so sure.
The purpose of the present paper is not to discuss the broad gen-
eral subject of checks and balances in this, or any other, government,
but to call attention to a few considerations only. These, in the
main, affect the executive and the judiciary, rather than the legisla-
ture; and they will serve to show, perhaps, that neither of them can
always, and under all circumstances, rely upon any very sure protec-
tion to its legitimate powers. It is one thing, unfortunately, to put
intricate machinery in motion, and another, and quite a different,
thing, to make it, under unforeseen occurrences, work out the intended
results.
The assertion is often made that the power of the executive is
greater, more active, and more pervading, in this country, than it is
in Great Britain. Undoubtedly this is true; but it is also true that
the power depends very largely upon the enormous political patron-
age. A great inroad was made upon this, for the benefit of the
Senate, by the Tenure of Office Act, and while that act remains in
force, the available authority of the president will depend on other
circumstances than the written law. With a friendly congress, or a
congress nearly balanced between the parties, his authority will still
be powerful; but an overwhelming majority against him in congress
may at any time reduce him to a condition little better than that of
a ministerial agent, compelled to commission officers, the appoint-
ment of whom is, in effect, dictated by the senate, and to put in force
the laws passed over his head. At best he can only bargain with the
senate for a share in the offices, and the share allowed him will be
likely to depend upon the strength of his party, and the hold he may
be supposed to have upon the people. In a time of violent party
passion and excitement, when the president would need protection.
most, he might find none at all, except such as might rest in the good
sense and caution of his adversaries. The violent partisan may be
ready enough to find a "high crime and misdemeanor" in any
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320 SOME CHECKS AND BALANCES
sibly find that he holds his position on condition of strict obedience
to party behests, and must not venture to interpose "checks" or
"balances " to the will of the party as expressed in congress. This
is undoubtedly to suppose a very extreme case, but it is for precisely
such cases that there is most occasion to provide balances.
In any contest between congress, on the one hand, and the presi-
dent, on the other, if the latter shall be found to need support or
protection in his just authority as against the inroads of violent
passion, or of cool, but reckless, party schemes, the judiciary can not
render it. The judiciary is sometimes said to be the chief conserv-
ative power in the government, but it has no conservative authority
for such a case. It may exercise a conservative influence by keeping
on quietly and peaceably in deciding causes between man and man,
and by setting the example of a careful observance of the constitu-
tion and of the laws; but that is all. Its utterances, even though
legitimately expressed in actual legal controversies, on questions that
might divide an excited congress and a powerless president, would
be utterly futile for good, and might even tend to fan the flames of
passion, and possibly result in bringing retributory legislation upon
the court itself. Whatever may have been any one's theories, the
truth, sufficiently manifest at this time, is, that the reliance of the
president, in the exercise of what he believes to be his just powers,
and in the performance of what appears to him to be his duty under
the constitution, must be found, not in any balance which the judi-
ciary can interpose, but in such a balance of parties as will enable
him to have a voice in legislation, and as will ^protect him against a
mere partisan impeachment and conviction.
The judiciary—from the very nature of its powers, and from its
dependence upon the other departments, not only for the law that it
is to administer and that shall govern in the administration, but also
for the means of enforcing its own judgments—is, and must always
be, less capable than the other departments, of protecting itself, either
in its persomiel or in its jurisdiction. In some cases, the provision
made for protection is only such as assumes that legislation will
always be wise, and that the electoral body will never be actuated by
passion, or have unworthy ends in view. Such has been the case in
some states where the judicial elections were annual, making the
steady retention of public favor essential to the continuance of the
judge in his position. Under such a system, the judge who cares to
retain his position is much less independent than is either the chief









































































































































member of either of the political departments is not confined to the
administration of definite rules, which he should apply without fear
or favor, but he assists in making rules, and he may study policy,
consult the varying phases of public opinion and desire, and by a
judicious trimming of sails, may sometimes recover himself when the
squall seems at first to have capsized him. Besides, he is enabled to
mingle with the people; he can appeal to them in person, or through
the newspapers, in explanation or excuse of his course; and if he has
ability and tact, it will be surprising if he does not succeed in induc-
ing an offended constituency, as Henry Clay did once under like cir-
cumstances, to " pick the flint and try the trusted rifle once more."
The judge has no such resources, even if he were disposed to make
use of them. In securing and retaining the public esteem and sup-
port, his reliance, if he is a fit judge, must be upon his own integrity,
his attention to his duties, and such force of reasoning as may appear
in his written opinions. If these fail him, there would seem to be
nothing else of which a judge could properly make use, or rely upon
to sustain him.
The constitutional history of the United States, using the word
now in its judicial, rather than its political sense, opens in Rhode
Island, with the setting aside of a bench of judges, for venturing to
declare the law when the popular passion demanded that it should
be perverted. The period was one of general indebtedness and
heavy taxation, both made more burdensome by general stagnation
in business. The circumstances demanded "relief" for the people,
and the available relief seemed to be an issue of paper money, by
means of which public and private debts, alike, might be paid. The
average legislator, who can levy taxes, create and fill offices, and
then abolish them, impose restrictions on trade, even to the extent
of destroying it—if he shall please to do so—is slow to believe that
there is any law of political economy operating among those over
whom he is set as a ruler, which he can not, or should not, compel to
bend and conform to such enactments as the good of his constituents
may demand, and as he may devise for their welfare. And if there
be such laws, which his constituents have found to work oppressively,
what more effectuai device could be invented for thwarting them,
than that of punishing such as may be obstinate enough to observe
them?
Paper issues have often been based on nothing more substantial
than faith and hope, but in this instance the ultimate reliance was










































































































































under which every man who refused to take the paper money, at its
face in gold, was to be arrested, summarily convicted, and punished.
In some quarters there were persons who doubted the rightfulness
of such laws, and for that reason, or, perhaps, because of the possible
delays that might result, jury trial was denied to accused parties.
In this denial lurked the danger to the judges. The colonial charter
made jury trial a matter of right, and the judges, if they heeded their
oaths, were compelled to hold that the privilege could not be taken
away. And this, like honest men, they did. But the judges were
got rid of, and the purpose of the paper issues was accomplished, to
the extent of a substantial repudiation of the public debt, and of
private debts also.
The moral deducible from these transactions is no different from
that which may be drawn from many others, equally well remem-
bered. They only demonstrate what needed no proof, that obedience
to the law, purity of motive, and honesty in action, can not protect
an officer whose integrity has been exhibited in a refusal to yield to
an imperious popular clamor. It does not placate an angry people
to assure them that a judge who has resisted their demands has
obeyed the law: what they want, under such circumstances, is a
judge whose facile principles will allow him to indicate a way by
which the law may be evaded, rather than one who is disposed to
heed the admonitions of conscience. The case mentioned is a strik-
ing, rather than an anomalous, one. It is not often that so bold a
repudiation of the law, and of those chosen to administer it, occurs;
but the instances are sufficient to prove that whenever circumstances
favor the attempt, there will be no lack of interested parties ready to
lead in making it. In several of the states, if the records were com-
plete and truthful, there would be facts recorded of a like repudia-
tion of faithful officers; and in some instances, with much less excuse
than in that of the people of Rhode Island, impoverished and bur-
dened as they were by the pressure of public and private debts.
The first occasion of note when the judiciary and the executive
came in conflict, was on the accession to power of the Republican
party under the lead of Mr. Jefferson. An examination of the facts
will serve to show how helpless must be the judiciary, whenever the
executive feels sufficiently strong with the legislature, to be secure
in setting the courts at defiance. Two occurrences attract particular
attention here: the setting aside of the circuit and district judges,
who had been appointed and confirmed for life, near the close of Mr.









































































































































court, a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to deliver
commissions, which, though actually made out and sealed, had not
been delivered when Mr. Adams retired from office.
By the repeal of the Judiciary Act, a large number of judges,
appointed in the last days of the Adams administration, were de-
prived of their offices. There were no longer courts in which they
might sit. The constitution itself provided that the judges should
hold during good behavior, but though accused of no bad behavior,
their tenure was terminated- There might be a question whether
they were not still entitled to their salaries, but this would be all.
The right to these was denied, and no attempt was made to collect
them. It was on the occasion of this repeal that congress was first
dazzled by the genius of John Randolph. "I am free to declare,"
he said, " that if the extent of this bill is to get rid of the judges, it
is a perversion of your power to a base purpose: it is an unconstitu-
tional act. If, on the contrary, it aims not at the displacing one set
of men, from whom you differ in political opinion, with a view to
introduce others, but for the general good, by abolishing useless
offices, it is a constitutional act. The quo animo determines the
nature of this act, as it determines the guilt or innocence of other
acts." He compared it to an impeachment, and denied that it was
admissible to draw arguments against the power from its capability
of being put to flagitious uses by an unscrupulous majority. Every
government presupposes a certain degree of honesty in its rulers.
Yes, and every government presupposes a certain degree of
honesty in its people. It is a species of impeachment when a judge
is assailed for his opinions upon being named for a reelection. It is
a species of impeachment when a concerted assault is made upon him
in the papers for something he has said, or done, or left undone.
Several able judges have been convicted and removed on such im-
peachments— convicted of not finding the law to be what their
assailants desired. The question does not so much concern the tri-
bunal of impeachment, as the probability of a just trial in it. It is
this that concerns judges most; the probability of being treated
fairly when called to an account. And on this point those who have
planned and theorized have usually left out of view one important
consideration: they have not taken into account the power of the
caucus; not so much, perhaps, the power of the town or city caucus,
as that of the legislature, which has sometimes displayed an ability
to bring about a unanimity of praise or censure to which the inferior







































































































































SOME CHECKS AND BALANCES
degree of boldness to say that the judiciary is safer in the hands of
partisan majorities in the legislature, than in the hands of partisan
majorities in a popular vote. It was the legislature which brought
the Rhode Island judges to account, and New England can present
other instances in which a party majority in the legislature has
refused a reelection to judges who have faithfully, honestly, and ably
performed their duty. But this subject is aside from the constitu-
tional power to abolish offices conferred in freehold. Upon that
effective arguments have always been found in numbers, and the
precedents, state and federal, favor the power.1 When a man's right
to appropriate what his neighbor possesses depends on the quo animo,
the neighbor may as well surrender it without making difficulty.
The case of the attempt to compel the delivery of commissions to
officers appointed by Mr. Adams presents some points which are
now, and probably always will be, of interest. Marbury with others
had been duly nominated, and confirmed by the senate, as a justice
of the peace for the District of Columbia. Nothing but the formal
commission was wanted to clothe him with official authority, and the
delivery of this had been delayed. He applied for it to Mr. Madison,
the secretary of state, but the delivery was refused. He then applied
to the supreme court for the compulsory writ of mandamus. The
supreme court, having for its mouthpiece Chief Justice Marshall, then
just beginning to exhibit his remarkable powers in that tribunal,
decided that it must deny the writ, because the issue of it would be
the exercise of original jurisdiction in a case in which, under the con-
stitution, the court could not be clothed with original jurisdiction.
When this conclusion was reached, the case was necessarily at an
end. Under such circumstances, a court usually refrains from the
expression of an opinion on the merits, because it can be nothing
more than extra-judicial. Nevertheless the judges of the Federal
supreme court have sometimes deemed it advisable to express impor-
tant opinions in cases- thus circumstanced. They did so in the case
of Dred Scott, and they did so in this case of Marbury versus Madi-
son. The reason in each instance has generally been assumed to
have been the same—to influence the action of the political depart-
ments of the government by judicial opinions on questions of consti-"
tutional law. In neither instance was the purpose accomplished, nor
would it be likely to be under any similar circumstances that might
arise hereafter. Such opinions can only come as advice offered to
'Similar legislation had previously been had in Maryland and Virginia, and was after-










































































































































parties who have not requested it, and who will be more likely to
resent the giving of it than voluntarily to follow it. The chief justice
must have assumed the contrary when he prefaced his decision that
the court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief with the unanimous
opinion of the court that by the signing and sealing of the commis-
sion Mr. Marbury became legally entitled to the office, and "that
having a legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the
commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that
right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy." 1
What was that remedy? It is certain that Mr. Marbury never
found it, or, at least, that he never made it available. Mr. Madison
disregarded the obiter opinion, and Mr. Jefferson treated it with con-
tempt. "The federal judges," he said, "declared that commissions
signed and sealed by the president were valid though not delivered.
I deemed delivery essential to complete a deed, which, as long as it
remains in the hands of the party, is as yet no deed. It is in posse
only, but not in esse, and I withheld delivery of the commissions."'
What would have been done had the court reached the conclu-
sion that it might, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, issue
the writ of mandamus, is a question of more than mere curious inter-
est. It involves, first, the probable action .of the court, and second,
the probable action of the secretary and the president. Would the
court have ventured to issue the writ of mandamus to the head of a
department in a case of this peculiar character, and to have attempted
its enforcement? The responsibility, it must be admitted, would
have been very serious. It is as certain as anything of the kind can
well be, that Mr. Jefferson would have instructed his subordinate not
to obey such a writ. He would have regarded the delivery of the
commission as an executive act, in the performance of which the
secretary would be his agent merely, and holding, as he always did,
that the executive had a right to construe the constitution for him-
self, he would have declined to take the law from the supreme court,
or from any other court. The chief justice, it is not improbable,
knew this at the time, and he certainly had every reason to believe
that in directing a refusal to obey the writ of mandamus, the presi-
dent would be supported by the approval of congress.
The writ of mandamus is an exceedingly serviceable writ where
mere ministerial duties are neglected, and is often employed to com-
pel the performance of duty by inferior officers, or even by heads of
1 Marbury vs. Madison, Cranch's Reports, 137; Flanders, Lives of the Chief Justices, 354.








































































































































SOME CHECKS AND BALANCES
departments. But whether ft may be issued to the executive him-
self, or to one of his subordinate agents in the performance of an
executive duty, is the question which would have confronted the
court in Marbury's case. The question has often arisen in the state
courts, and sometimes the power has been exercised, and sometimes
denied. Mr. Chase, when Governor of Ohio, submitted to the writ
in several instances ; but it is believed that in each case the governor
only desired to obtain an authoritative exposition of some law under
which duties had been devolved upon him, and did not care to ex-
amine the questions for the purposes of an independent opinion.
Where the courts have examined with deliberation the question of
their power, they have generally denied its existence.1
Is the executive above the laws? has been the query in these
cases. Is not every man who is wronged entitled to a remedy, just
as much when wronged by the executive as when wronged by an
inferior officer or by an individual? Yes, doubtless, every man is
entitled to his remedy, and the executive must be subservient to the
laws. But every wrong can not be redressed by the courts. Some
wrongs are political, and must be redressed, if at all, by the people
themselves. Some wrongs can only be redressed by the legislature.
A state wrongs her creditors when she refuses to pay the interest on
her debts, but the courts can not help them. The forum of redress
is the legislature, and if they apply there, and can obtain none, they
are remediless. A court sometimes, through error or perverseness
of judgment, turns a just cause out of court, and the plaintiff, though
wronged, obtains no remedy. And yet neither legislature nor court
is above the law. In the particular cases they are to administer the
law, and they decide against the remedy applied for.
Now the governor of a state is an independent department of the
government, as much as the legislature or the judiciary. He has his
duties assigned to him by the constitution, and the departments to
which duties of a different nature are delegated can not, by virtue of
such delegation, interfere with them. Presumptively, whatever he
does, as executive, will be rightly and lawfully done, and will deprive
no one of a lawful right. If he denies the application of any private
person, it is to be assumed it was because the applicant had no law-
ful right to have it granted. If he is an independent department,
this presumption must apply in his favor, just as it must be in favor
1 This subject was briefly referred to in an article published in the last volume of the










































































































































of the final action of a court. To subject him to the process of the
court, would be to render him subordinate, just as a court would be
made subordinate, if the executive should set aside its conclusion and
direct a different judgment. The independence of a department is
destroyed when another department may overrule its action. The
latter is no longer a check or a balance, but has become a master.
Besides, who is to enforce a writ of mandamus against the execu-
tive? This is a pertinent question, at least, for mere advisory powers
are not usually conferred in government, and are not likely to be
respected when they are. A writ of mandamus can not deprive
the executive of authority, or paralyze his powers. He will still be
the chief conservator of peace of the state, with ministerial officers
under him. He will be commander-in-chief of the military forces of
the state. If disorder breaks out, the law contemplates that it shall
be quelled under his orders, and if the process of one of the courts is
resisted, it is the executive who is to be called upon for its enforce-
ment. When, therefore, a court undertakes to subject him to its
mandatory process, it is proceeding against the officer who is himself
the representative of the force of the state, and who may make use
of the peace officers, as well as of the military power of the state,
with all presumptions of law in his favor. It is but too manifest that
he has only to refuse obedience to such a writ, and it becomes
ineffectual; or that, if the attempt is made to enforce it, the power
to compel will be insignificant, as compared with the power to resist.
An assertion of a power in the courts,*then, to issue coercive pro-
cess against the executive, would be the assertion of a power every
exercise of which would invite collision; and in every collision, the
executive would come off triumphant. This must be true as a rule.
An exception might exist when the popular voice happened to
approve the judicial action, and was sufficiently pronounced to render
it politic for the executive to listen to it. Undoubtedly a governor
would consider with some care what a hostile legislative majority
would be likely to do, before he would venture upon a collision. A
conflict with the legislature might be a much more serious thing, to
the executive, than a conflict with the judiciary. The legislature
makes laws and adapts them to the circumstances; and the boundary
between executive and legislative authority in the control of the
army is not so clearly defined as to warrant the executive, under any
circumstances, in trying extreme conclusions with the legislature.
Besides, he would be in conflict with the body having the impeaching








































































































































SOME CHECKS AND BALANCES
All this does not prove that any officer or department is above
the laws. The constitution supposes that all will do their duty.
But it nevertheless provides for official crimes and misdemeanors,
what is supposed to be, the adequate remedy of impeachment. The
same remedy is provided for corresponding offenses, whether com-
mitted by judge or by governor. In this manner the constitution pre-
serves the independence of the departments, and at the same time
preserves, over all, the dominion of the law.
Some of the questions which have been touched upon have
pointed application, at the present time, to a controversy which has
arisen in the state of South Carolina between the executive on the
one side, and two persons who assert their title by election to certain
state judgeships, on the other. The constitution of the state pro-
vides that the election shall be made by the legislature, and it has
been so made. But the constitution also provides that the governor
"shall commission all officers of the state,"1 and this, in the case of
these persons, the governor refuses to do. The refusal is put on the
ground of their dishonesty, profligacy, and notorious unfitness for
the position.
This controversy is referred to, not for the purpose of considering
how it should be decided or disposed of, but only to show that there
may be occurrences in government for which no adequate provision
can be made in advance, and when one department will exercise a
power which was perhaps never intended to be conferred. Of course,
if the governor is correct in asserting that one of the newly elected
judges is a mere ignorant adventurer, and that both are notorious-
ly dishonest, he is not to be censured if he employs all legitimate
means to prevent their induction to office. He could not well do
otherwise if he regards the good name of his state, and takes pride in
her judicial annals, on which are inscribed the names of many very-
able jurists. But the question of the fitness of the candidate for an
office is for the body which elects, and unfitness does not defeat an
election regularly made. The questions that arise in this case seem
to be, first, whether the rights of the claimants have been fixed by
the election, and second, what remedy they may have to enforce their
rights if they shall be found to have any. The first question seems
to depend on whether the issue of a commission is necessary to com-
plete the title to the office. Chief Justice Marshall held, in Marbury's
case, that the title of- the office was perfected when the commission
was signed and sealed, and that the commission was only evidence









































































































































of the title which might also be made out by other evidence. But
here no commission is either signed or sealed; there is only an elec-
tion. There is indeed one distinction between this case and Mar-
bury's: here, the body that elects has done all that was necessary to
the complete expression of its will in the election: there, the officer
having the power of appointment had withheld the final act which
was to evidence his intent that the appointee should have the office.
But whether this is a controlling circumstance will doubtless be made
a question. It may be urged, with some force, that the constitution
does not, usually, impose mere ministerial duties on the chief execu-
tive, and that the requirement that he shall commission officers,
carries with it some presumption that, in his discretion, he may refuse.
But when a governor takes such a position, whether legally right
or wrong in doing so, the noticeable fact is, that, so far as he is con-
cerned, the parties are without any effective remedy. If the legis-
lature sympathize with the claimants, they may possibly impeach him,
but impeachment could not give them their office if he still retained
his. Possibly, however, an efficient remedy might be in their own
hands, consisting in their taking possession of the offices, at the
proper time, on an assumption that the commissions were wholly
unnecessary to their title. The difficulties that might be encountered
in so doing will be alluded to further on.
In considering the position of the judiciary, it is worth while to
bear in mind that its power may, sometimes, be very effectually par-
alyzed by the refusal of executive aid in enforcing its judgments.
Illustrations in the history of the federal government are found in
the Cherokee cases, arising in the state of Georgia. In those cases
the judicial authorities of the state were enabled to set the federal
supreme court at defiance. Obedience to its judgments could not be
compelled without a resort to force, and force required the aid of the
executive. Jackson is reported to have said: "John Marshall has
made his decision; now let him enforce it." One man was hung,
and others were sent to the penitentiary by the judgment of the
state courts, for offenses committed in territory which the federal
supreme court had decided was excluded from state jurisdiction by
the treaties with the Indians.1 One can readily understand what a
1 "Worcester vs. Georgia, 6 Peters' Reports, 515. Mr. Niles in his Register, Vol. 39-44,
collects the various documents on this subject, and short accounts appear in Flanders'
Lives of the Chief Justices, p. 430-437; Kennedy's Life of Wirt; Sargeant's Public Men
and Events, Vol. L, p. 177, and many other books. In the Bench and Bar of Georgia, by







































































































































33° SOME CHECKS AND BALANCES
farce it would have been to attempt the control of President Jackson
by the employment of the writ of mandamus.
In Merryman's case, the futility of judicial attempts to control
the action of the executive was also illustrated. This man was
arrested by military orders in Maryland, on charges of treason, and
was confined in Fort McHenry. Congress had not yet suspended
the privilege of the habeas corpus, and on the petition of Merryman,
Chief Justice Taney issued the writ to inquire into his detention.
The officer having him in charge declined to produce him, alleging,
as a reason, that he had been authorized by the president to suspend
the habeas corpus for the public safety. The chief justice being of
the opinion that the president could not confer any such power,
directed an attachment to issue to bring the officer before the court
to answer for his contempt in refusing to obey the writ. But the
attachment was not served, and could not have been. The chief jus-
tice conceded this, and dismissed the case with the remark: "Under
the circumstances I can barely say, to-day, I shall reduce to writing
the reasons under which I have acted, and which have led me to the
conclusions expressed in my opinion, and shall report them, with
these proceedings, to the president of the United States, and call
upon him to perform his constitutional duty to enforce the laws; in
other words, to enforce the process of this court. This is all this
court has now the power to do." 1 Inter arma silent leges. But this
is all the court would have had the power to do, at any time, with a
president inclined not to submit, and a congress sympathizing with
him in his refusal.
That the judiciary has no power to control the political action of
the executive, has twice been formally decided by the federal supreme
court, in cases in which the reconstruction acts were called in ques-
tion, and the endeavor was made to prevent their enforcement as
unconstitutional. The decisions are sufficient to show, if it were not
otherwise thoroughly demonstrated, that the judiciary is not always
the final arbiter of constitutional questions; and as to some ques-
tions, from their nature, can not be. Some of the practical difficul-
ties are stated by Chief Justice Chase in the case of Mississippi.
"Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If
state decisions were rendered, and of his action in these cases. The persons sent to the
penitentiary remained there until they solicited for a pardon, which was granted. A report
of the Georgia legislature reviewing the cases appears in Niles' Register, Vol. 42, p. 58.











































































































































the president refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the
court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand,
the president complies with the order of the court, and refuses to
execute the acts of congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur
between the executive and legislative departments of the govern-
ment? May not the house of representatives impeach the president
for such refusal? And in that case could this court interfere on
behalf of the president, thus endangered by compliance with its
mandates, and restrain, by injunction, the senate of the United States
from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spec-
tacle be offered, to the public world, of an attempt, by this court, to
arrest proceedings in that court? These questions answer them-
selves." 1 In the case of Georgia, decided a little later, it was more
distinctly declared that the judiciary can not protect even the vital
rights of states against the encroachments of the political depart-
ments." Indeed, whenever in any case of considerable importance it
has been insisted that the action of the president was in excess of
constitutional power, the courts have been powerless to act. Mr.
Jefferson thought he had no authority to acquire foreign territory;
but when he had acted, and the two houses of congress had approved
his action, the judiciary could only recognize it. It was immaterial
what the judges might think as to his right.
Returning now to the case of persons claiming to be chosen as
judges, but not commissioned, it may be remarked, if seats are
vacant upon the bench, that they may possibly meet with no imped-
iment in occupying them. If, however, the executive refuses to
recognize their right, the end, if we may judge by experience, can
be easily foreseen. But this assumes that the executive shall be able
to sustain himself with the legislature: if he fails in that, he must
fail entirely.
A judge may be such, de facto, or de jure. If he comes in by
color of authority, and actually exercises the judicial power with
public acquiescence, his acts, in that capacity, can not be questioned
collaterally. This seems to be almost a necessary rule in any good
government; and it had the approval of Chief Justice Chase in cases
of convictions before judges disqualified by the fourteenth amend-
ment to the constitution. But the controlling consideration in such
cases is the acquiescence referred to—the public recognition of official
1 State of Mississippi vi, Johnson, 4 Wallace's Reports, 475, 500; Macpherson's His-
tory of Reconstruction, 239.








































































































































SOME CHECKS AND BALANCES
character; and.wherever that is wanting, the person must rely upon
his actual title to the office. The question whether he has a right is,
undoubtedly, a judicial question where no method of determining it,
finally, has been prescribed by the constitution; and one asserting
the right, is entitled, in such cases, to a judicial trial. But there
may be judicial questions which, from the nature of the case, it is
impossible to submit to a judicial tribunal.
The Federalists of New Hampshire, in 1813, following an example
set by the Democrats of Massachusetts in 1811, proceeded to abolish
and reorganize courts, in order to get rid of Democratic judges.
Among those abolished was the supreme court, the judges of which
denied the validity of the legislature, and persisted in retaining their
places. For a time there were two sets of judges, each claiming law-
ful authority, and each assuming to act. Who should decide between
them? Manifestly neither of them was competent to decide finally
upon its own right, and in the absence of any tribunal empowered
to adjudicate their claims, the controversy could only, at last, be
settled by circumstances, and by public acquiescence in the preten-
sions of one of them. But when the right to an office is to be deter-
mined by circumstances, the most important must always be the
recognition, by the political departments of the government, of one
claimant, to the exclusion of the other. Usually, this must be con-
clusive, because it will determine the public acquiescence. If the
executive were alone in his recognition, and both legislature and
people were against him, it might be otherwise, as the royal judges
in Massachusetts discovered a century ago; but cases can not often
occur, now, where the executive can be so powerless. In New
Hampshire there was no active interference by the governor, but the
old judges soon abandoned the contest as hopeless. A fiery and
impetuous governor would, perhaps, have sent a squad of men to
break up their sittings, as was done in one state, under somewhat
similar circumstances, after the breaking out of the late civil war;
and while this violence would have been wholly unnecessary, it is
difficult to discover any means of calling him to account. His action
might have made the next election more heated, and possibly have
led to the defeat of his party, but the political remedy would have
been the only one by means of which he could have been reached.
The assertion of one set of men that they constitute the judiciary of
the state can not give them practical authority, as such, when the
other departments refuse to recognize them. And this suggests a









































































































































the whole bench of judges constituting its highest court is changed,
at one time, by popular election. It is easy to suppose a case in
which a contest might arise between the old bench, claiming to have
been reelected, and a new set of men, claiming to have been chosen
to their places; and unless there were careful provision for a deter-
mination of the controversy by some political tribunal, it would
almost certainly be determined by the recognition of one set of
claimants by the executive, unless he should be confronted by a hos-
tile legislature, who should recognize the contestants.
Something has been said in this paper regarding the dependence
of an elective judiciary on the popular favor, but it was not meant to
open any discussion regarding the proper method of selecting judges.
That subject is a very broad, and very difficult, one, and the evils
which the several methods have developed within the last few years,
have not made it any less difficult. Some ugly facts have been
brought out, which theories had not prepared us to anticipate. We
have found it possible for politicians, as well as popular conventions,
to insist upon the selection of men because of their unfitness, as well
as because of their fitness. In this, all would agree. But on another
point there is a popular misapprehension, namely, that the federal
judiciary, after the appointment and commissioning of the judges, is
practically independent of political control.
So far as the inferior federal courts are concerned, it was made
manifest in Mr. Jefferson's time, that their organization was entirely
within the reach and control of congress. A sudden and very great
change in parties, at some presidential election, might, at any time,
be followed by some very startling changes in that regard. Nor is
the supreme court beyond the reach of congress. It is a constitu-
tional court, it is true, and therefore can not be abolished, but con-
gress may increase the judges indefinitely, and it is consequently
never beyond the danger of having its action controlled by adding to
its numbers. It is still more assailable in its jurisdiction.
In Marbury's case, Chief Justice Marshall asserted very positively
that the petitioner not only had a right, but that he also had a
remedy, in the law. The implication was that he might obtain this
remedy in an inferior court. But it was never obtained, and the
whole batch of abolished federal judges submitted to the action of
congress while protesting its invalidity. Mr. Van Buren finds a
reason for this acquiescence, in the power of congress, at any time,
to strip the supreme court of a large portion of its jurisdiction; a







































































































































334 CHECKS AND BALANCES IN GOVERNMENT.
be exercised if the removed judges made any attempt to resist the
will of congress.1 We can not now know how much there is to this
suggestion, but it is not many years since this very power was exer-
cised by congress, lest the supreme court should pass upon a ques-
tion on which its opinion, at the time, was not desired by that body:
and the competency of the action was affirmed by the court, though
it took away jurisdiction of a pending case."
Enough has been said to show that the checks and balances which
are to protect judicial independence, are not so perfectly arranged,
and so complete in their provisions for probable cases, as may have
been supposed. Sometimes, one or the other political department
becomes, for the time being, supreme. Sometimes, the judiciary
may be wronged in such a way that no redress will be open to it,
except such political redress as a reasonable balance of parties may
give hope for. And this renders it necessary that the judiciary should
have a strong hold on the public favor and respect; for in this, after
all, must be found the true basis for an independent judiciary.
Judicial independence does not consist, wholly, in a secure tenure
of office. It is to be found, rather, in that combination of circum-
stances which neither compels the judge, nor invites him, to swerve,
to the right hand nor to the left, when the path of his duty is plain
before him. A secure tenure of office is one important circumstance,
but it is not always the most important. Hope is often more power-
ful than fear; and a position longed for may influence, improperly,
when the dread of losing the present position would be comparatively
without influence. Whatever, for this, or any other, cause, tends to
lessen the influence of the judiciary, is of very serious consequence,
since the effect is to weaken a conservative power which is peculiarly
liable, through no fault of its own, to have its just powers encroached
upon, and sometimes resisted and nullified.
We might be tempted again to quote from John Adams, that to
say it is extremely difficult to preserve a balance in government is
no more than to say it is extremely difficult to preserve liberty. But
it might be said, with some reason, that such remarks became trite
half a century ago. We take the balance for granted, because we
have provided for it by our constitutions. But it can not be unim-
portant to know that there are many cases in which the balance is
liable to be thrown out of adjustment, and that some of these may
be of very serious consequence in government, unless receiving wise
and cautious treatment by the people, as well as by those set over them.
1 Van Buren's Political Parties in the United States, 306-8.
3 McCardle's Case, 7 Wallace, 506.
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